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BOOK REVIEWS

Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, by Merold Westphal. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm
B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2014. 294 pages. $35.00 (paperback).
MARK A. TIETJEN, University of West Georgia
In the past two decades there has been a surge of interest in the concept of
love in Søren Kierkegaard’s thought. Monographs like M. Jamie Ferreira’s
Love’s Grateful Striving (2001) and C. Stephen Evans’s Kierkegaard’s Ethic of
Love (2004) and collections of essays like the Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook
(1998) and International Kierkegaard Commentary, v.16 (2000), have drawn
attention to Kierkegaard’s most important book on Christian ethics, Works
of Love, and located the mother of virtues as a central concept within
Kierkegaard’s vast authorship.
If there is another theological virtue given equal if not greater airtime in
Kierkegaard, it would be faith, and this should come as no surprise when
one recognizes Kierkegaard’s stated intention of reintroducing Christianity
into Christendom. However, there has been less dedicated attention to this
concept, despite its prominent place in so many of Kierkegaard’s most important writings. In Fear and Trembling, one is introduced to the idea of faith
as an absolute relation to the absolute. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
Kierkegaard’s pseudonym paraphrases faith as an objective uncertainty to
which one is committed with the utmost passion and inwardness. And in
The Sickness unto Death, faith, contraposed to despair, is a transparent, restful relation to God.
In Merold Westphal’s Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith, we find these and
other conceptions and nuances of faith carefully articulated, distinguished,
and clarified. The book is organized in three sections, each one devoted
to the work of one particular pseudonym. The first and largest concerns
the lone work of the pseudonym Johannes de Silentio and Kierkegaard’s
most well-known work, Fear and Trembling. Given the depth, breadth, and
quality of these chapters, this near-half of the volume bests many standalone commentaries on Fear and Trembling in its ability to make readable
Kierkegaard’s highly challenging and often misread masterpiece. Section
two is devoted to the writings of Johannes Climacus (Philosophical Fragments
pp. 471–474
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and Concluding Unscientific Postscript), while section three takes up AntiClimacus’s books (The Sickness unto Death and Practice in Christianity). The
chapters that comprise each section take as their topic a particular thesis or
conceptual remark about faith, giving us twelve in all. (There is a thirteenth
chapter, an “interlude,” which I will return to shortly.) These include the
following: faith as the task of a lifetime, faith as the highest passion, faith as
a leap and a striving, and faith as contemporaneity with Christ—without
offense. A simple glance at the table of contents’ list of these theses immediately conveys the complexity of faith in Kierkegaard’s thought and, consequently, the very need for a work that attends to that complexity.
Those curious about Kierkegaard’s view of faith or generally interested
in developing in Christian faith themselves may find the issue of pseudonymity in Kierkegaard confusing, intimidating, or distracting. For these
readers, Westphal helpfully explains this unusual authorial method. For
the Kierkegaard scholar, Westphal goes a step further by justifying the
title of his book—Kierkegaard’s concept of faith—and succinctly defeating
stalling worries that would keep analysis of faith from moving forward.
In the course of this discussion in the book’s introduction, he offers encouragement to the reader hoping to grow in faith, pointing out how for
Kierkegaard, the very process of writing was itself a process of spiritual
development and instruction. Kierkegaard believed that God reared him
through his writings. Thus, to read with an eye toward appropriation is
the right way to go, whereas those whose chief aim is some increase in
knowledge, even theological knowledge, are not just reading Kierkegaard
wrongly, but Westphal wrongly.
Kierkegaard’s Concept of Faith is vintage Westphal in its emphasis on Kier
kegaard’s work as ideology critique. Echoing his 1987 Kierkegaard’s Critique of Reason and Society (Penn State), Westphal argues that Kierkegaard’s
harsh words about reason bear more resemblance to Jesus’s harsh words
to the Pharisees than they do the irrationalist caricatures still perpetuated
about Kierkegaard. “Instead of assuming that Christianity must somehow
show itself to be reasonable, it is the ideological concept of reason that
needs to show us why we should adopt it. Does not every established
order become evil just to the degree that it absolutizes itself, confuses itself with God or the kingdom of God?” (96). He helpfully expands and
updates this insight by reminding us that the natural sciences (in our day)
rather than speculative philosophy (in Kierkegaard’s day) are more likely
to fill the role of self-legitimizing arbiter of what counts as reason. Thus,
to the metaphysical naturalism often assumed in scientific inquiry, “faith
cannot submit without losing its own soul” (225).
Westphal weighs in on and presents refreshing perspectives on some
old debates about Kierkegaard, such as the claim that he is a volitionalist
(that beliefs are something that one can will) and that he is the father of existentialism. Concerning the latter, he argues that for Kierkegaard existence
is “a technical term for the distinctive temporality of human life,” and thus
when we think of existence in light of the notion of “becoming a Christian,”
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we can qualify the epithet’s meaning (167). Westphal also engages some of
the newer debates: that Kierkegaard is a proto-deconstructionist (see the
introduction) and that he is some sort of divine command theorist.
The latter topic is addressed at length in the interlude, the chapter immediately following chapter 3: faith as obedience to divine commands.
While I cannot go into the arguments in detail, let me offer a few observations that speak to the strategies and quality of the book as a whole. First,
to the aid of non-philosophers, Westphal begins with a clear and accessible
primer on epistemology and hermeneutics, thus introducing figures like
Reid, Moore, Chisholm, Gadamer, and Derrida and sketching general positions within which he can situate the text’s claims. The issue at stake is of
course the Akedah, Abraham’s binding of Isaac, and the many problems of
knowledge, trust, and obedience that story raises. The dialogue Westphal
stages between the text of Fear and Trembling and these other interlocutors is not merely an exercise in drawing interesting historical connections
(though it does that) but also one that directly addresses the very crucial
and common worries everyday people of faith ask themselves when they
read Genesis 22: what exactly does God promise and command Abraham,
and how am I to relate these promises and commands to my own situation? Ever mindful of these basic and essential concerns, Westphal enters
the current debate himself, offering nothing short of a literature review of
recent books that steer attention away from the importance of God’s commands and Abraham’s obedience to those commands. Those interested in
where Westphal lands will have to read for themselves. Suffice it to say that
the chapter perfectly exemplifies Westphal’s remarkable ability to speak to
novices and seasoned scholars almost at the same time, and to move scholarly conversations forward all the while making edifying remarks about
faith with clear implications for those seeking spiritual direction. One of
the most careful remarks of the book can be found in his discussion of
the objection to divine commands as arbitrary, an objection to divine commands that many college sophomores can recite from memory. Contrary
to the way the objection usually goes, arbitrariness does not necessarily
connote “irrationalism, despotism, or blind fanaticism,” and he illustrates
this through the amount of allowance a child might earn upon performing certain chores. No general rational principle supports a precise dollar
amount; thus in a sense that amount is arbitrary. Yet parents who arbitrarily assign $5 for taking out the trash are not irrational, despotic, or
fanatical. God’s commands may follow no rational principle we know, yet
that arbitrariness (perspectival arbitrariness, I would add) does not entail
the commands are irrational (to God), despotic, or fanatical.
If Westphal’s writing is instructive for newcomers to epistemology
and hermeneutics, it is instructive also for newcomers to the history of
philosophy, something true of every book of his I know. Consider the following gem: “Christianity is better off to have the Lessings of the world
reject it outright than to have the Hegels of the world (and the Kants,
for that matter) put it through the filter of (some version of) reason as
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recollection and given back to us as the new, improved, reasonable version of Christianity” (199). The ease with which Westphal moves between
conversations among philosophers ancient and postmodern, analytic and
continental, highlights the extent to which many of these categories are
mostly superficial distinctions we use to remain in our ideological bunkers. Westphal does not seem impressed by these categorizations, only by
the ideas themselves, and readers will find his non-partisan presentation
of them contagious.
In the end, one of the most winning features of Westphal’s book is its
faithfulness to Kierkegaard’s faithfulness to a biblical picture of faith. A
prime example comes when Westphal explores in chapter 8 faith as the
happy passion that overcomes offense. Working through the concept of
absolute paradox—a term that signifies the God-human Jesus Christ—
Westphal concludes: “In other words, the absolute paradox is the doctrine
of the incarnation combined with the doctrine of the atonement, which
presupposes the doctrine of the fall and culminates in the doctrine of reconciliation” (151).
Westphal’s monograph goes a long way toward remedying the vacuum
of work on Kierkegaardian faith, offering, among many other things, a
welcome antidote to the common caricatures of Kierkegaardian faith as an
irrational leap. It is only regrettable that the conversation is primarily confined to these five pseudonymous works, when in fact discussions of faith
can be found behind every nook and cranny of Kierkegaard’s vast authorship—signed writings, journals, and so on. One can only hope for a sequel.

The Severity of God: Religion and Philosophy Reconceived, by Paul Moser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 237 pages. $29.99 (paperback).
JACOB L. GOODSON, Southwestern College, Winfield, KS
In his book The Severity of God, Paul Moser’s primary argument is that
the academic discipline of philosophy must become Christ-centered in its
pursuit of the love of wisdom. The way to achieve this is for the field of
the philosophy of religion to develop the notion of “the severity of God”:
“only a severe God would be worthy of worship, but such a God would be
severely redemptive and thus vigorously transformative in a manner that
overturns business as usual in religion, theology, philosophy, and related
disciplines” (9). Moser contends that philosophers of religion ought to be
more careful with its “object” of study—God—and the question becomes
what kind of God is worthy of our philosophical investigations. The God
who remains “worthy of worship” is the same God who philosophers of
pp. 474–478
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